In an oligopoly, prior to choosing quantities/prices, each¯rm has an opportunity to form pair-wise collaborative links with other¯rms. These pair-wise links lower costs of production of the¯rms which form a link. The collection of pair-wise links de¯nes a collaboration network. We study stable and e±cient networks under di®erent types of market competition. We¯nd that except under extreme competition, a la Bertrand,¯rms have an incentive to collaborate with their competitors to lower costs of production. We¯nd that two simple architectures, the complete network, where every¯rm has a collaboration link with every other¯rm, and the network with a dominant group, which contains a large number of completely connected¯rms and several isolated¯rms, are stable under di®erent market conditions. We also observe that stable networks are often e±cient from a social point of view.
Introduction
Firms often collaborate with each other to share information on market conditions/new technologies as well as to jointly bear the cost of common facilities. These collaborative arrangements typically strengthen the competitive position of the¯rms involved in the collaboration and weaken the position of the¯rms outside the collaboration. Thus inter-¯rm collaborations have important e®ects on the functioning of the market. In this paper we study the incentives for¯rms to engage in collaborative arrangements and their aggregate welfare implications.
We develop a simple model to study these issues. Consider a oligopoly with symmetric rm; each¯rm has an opportunity to form pair-wise collaborative links with other¯rms.
These pair-wise links lower costs of production of¯rms which form a link. The collection of pair-wise links de¯nes a collaboration network and induces a distribution of costs across thē rms in the industry. The¯rms then compete in the market. We study the nature of stable collaboration networks under di®erent types of market competition.
The distinctive feature of our approach is that we allow for intransitive structures of collaboration. Thus, for example, it is possible that¯rm 1 has a collaborative relationship with¯rms 1 2 and 3, respectively, but that¯rms 2 and 3 do not have any collaborative relationship.
Allowing for intransitive structures opens up a very rich class of collaboration arrangements and also requires novel methods of analysis. 2 We start with a consideration of the textbook oligopoly setting: there are n¯rms, demand is 1 Such intransitive relationships are commonly observed in practice, both with regard to sharing common facilities as well as with regard to research and development activities. We give some examples of the latter. There are 2 possible networks. Thus, if n = 8 then there are 2 possible networks of collaboration! linear in price, and initially¯rms are symmetric, with zero¯xed costs and identical marginal costs of production. We assume that pair-wise links lower this marginal cost. In this setting, we¯nd that price competition leads¯rms to form no collaborative links, yielding the empty network, while quantity competition leads every pair of¯rms to form a link, thus generating the complete network. These networks are given in Figure 1 . We also¯nd that under price competition, every network with two or more fully connected¯rms is e±cient, while with Cournot competition, the complete network is the unique e±cient network. These results suggests that the nature of market competition has an important e®ect on the type of collaboration networks that arise, and that this has a bearing on the level of welfare as well.
The above results for quantity competition are obtained under the assumption that the marginal costs of a¯rm are declining linearly in the number of its collaboration links. We also examine the case of non-linearly decreasing marginal costs. We¯nd that if marginal cost decrease is a decreasing function of the number of links, then connected but intransitive networks of collaboration are stable. If, on the other hand, marginal cost decrease is an increasing function of the the number of links, then the complete network is stable. In addition, networks with a large dominant group and several isolated¯rms are also stable. Our results on intransitive stable networks rely on diminishing returns from link formation and, therefore, suggests that such patterns arise quite naturally. This¯nding is important since one of the motivations for the study of networks is precisely the possibility of modeling intransitive relationships. The rest of the paper explores the relationship between competition and collaboration in more general settings.
We approach the general problem as follows. A set of collaborative links de¯nes a network, which in turn generates a vector of costs for the di®erent¯rms. Given these costs,¯rms compete in the product market. Thus for a¯xed type of competition, we can de¯ne the corresponding payo®s of the¯rms for any given network. We model di®erent types of competition in terms of restrictions on the payo® functions. In particular, we consider two types of competition: aggressive and moderate.
Under aggressive competition, all but the lowest cost¯rms make zero pro¯ts. This allows for two subcases of interest: one, in which a lowest cost¯rm makes pro¯ts only if it is the unique such¯rm and two, if all lowest cost¯rms make positive pro¯ts. The¯rst possibility corresponds to the standard Bertrand competition under general homogeneous demand. In this case we¯nd that, the unique stable network is the empty network (Theorem 4.1). In the latter case we provide a complete characterization of stable networks: for markets with four or more¯rms, a network is stable if and only if it consists of one non-singleton complete component of size k 2 f3; 4; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; ng and n ¡ k singleton components (Theorem 4.2). This collaboration architecture resembles the familiar dominant cartel and fringe¯rms structure. Figure 2 illustrates the set of stable networks in this case, for a market with 5¯rms.
Under moderate competition, all¯rms make positive pro¯ts, but lower cost¯rms make larger pro¯ts. This case accommodates quantity competition under general homogeneous or di®erentiated demand, and price competition under di®erentiated demand. In this setting, stable networks possess greater variety and richer structure and it is di±cult to characterize them. We¯rst show that every¯rm with the same costs must be directly linked in a stable network. Thus, every pair of¯rms with the same costs levels must be linked in a stable network. We develop su±cient conditions for the complete network to be the unique stable network (Theorem 4.3). We¯nd that these conditions, though strong, are satis¯ed by a variety of standard models such as those mentioned above.
These results are in marked contrast to the results obtained by other authors (we discuss this literature below). One important assumption we make is that there are no spillovers across collaboration links of¯rms. This motivates an enquiry into the role of spillovers/externalities across collaboration links. The network structure allows us to de¯ne the`distance' between rms. We suppose that the extent of spillovers is inversely related to the`distance' between the¯rms in a collaboration network. Our analysis focusses on positive spillovers. Our results on aggressive competition extend to this setting easily. We, therefore, focus on the case of moderate competition. We¯nd that the complete network is a stable network in the presence of positive spillovers. However, in the linear demand model with quantity competition, partially connected networks are also stable. A comparison of this¯nding with our above results suggests that, under moderate competition, spillovers may have the e®ect of lowering the level of collaboration.
This paper is a contribution to the study of group formation and cooperation in oligopolies.
Our model of collaborative networks is inspired by the recent work on strategic models of network formation; see e.g., Aumann and Myerson (1989) , Bala and Goyal (1999) , Goyal (1993) , Goyal and Joshi (1999a, 1999b) , Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , Jackson and Watts (1998) ,
and Kranton and Minehart (1998) . To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is thē rst application of network games to the study of collaboration among oligopolistic¯rms.
Issues relating to group formation and cooperation have long been a central concern of economic theory, and game theory in particular. The traditional approach to these issues is in terms of coalitions. In recent years, there has been considerable work on coalition formation in games; see e.g., Bloch (1995 , Vohra (1997, 1998) , and Yi (1997 Yi ( ,1998 . For a survey of this work, refer to Bloch (1998) . One application of this theory is to the formation of groups in oligopolies. In this literature, group formation is modeled in terms of a coalition structure which is a partition of the set of¯rms. Each¯rm therefore, can belong to one and only one element of the partition, referred to as a coalition.
In our paper, we consider two-player relationships. In this sense, our model is somewhat restrictive as compared to the work referred to above, which allows for groups of arbitrary size. However, the principal distinction concerns the nature of collaboration structures we examine. Our approach accommodates collaborative relations that are non-transitive. From a conceptual point of view, this distinction is substantive. It means that we allow for relationships across coalitions. Thus, we consider a class of cooperative structures which is signi¯cantly di®erent from those studied in the coalition formation literature.
The network approach also leads to quite di®erent predictions concerning the nature of collaboration among¯rms. Bloch (1995 develops a sequential coalition unanimity game in which¯rms propose coalitions and a coalition is formed only if every member of a proposed coalition agrees to become a member. Each¯rm's marginal cost is linearly declining in the size of the coalition of which it is a member. After coalitions are formed, the¯rms compete as Cournot/Bertrand oligopolists in a di®erentiated market with homogeneous demand. Bloch demonstrates that generally there is a unique stable coalition structure in which¯rms are divided into two unequal groups. By contrast, we¯nd that the complete network, where every¯rm has a collaborative link with every other¯rm, is always stable. The arguments underlying these result exploit the possibility of intransitive relationships. Yi and Shin (1995) and Yi (1998) propose a simultaneous open membership game in which all players announce their decision to form coalitions at the same time and non-members cannot be excluded from joining a coalition. They obtain the grand coalition as the stable
outcome of the open membership game. Their approach is akin to a game in which the decision to join a coalition is one-sided. In such a game, in the presence of perfect spillovers, a member of a smaller group always has an incentive to join a larger group. In our paper, by contrast, link-formation is based on pair-wise incentive compatibility considerations, and it is therefore interesting to observe that a grand coalition can be obtained in such a setting also. Thus our results on complete networks (Theorems 4.2 and 4.3) provide an alternative explanation as to how a grand coalition may emerge.
Our paper is also related to the literature on cooperative R&D in oligopoly; see e.g., d`Apremont and Jacquemin (1988), Katz (1986) , Leahy and Neary (1998) , Suzumura (1992) . This literature considers a two stage process: in the¯rst stage,¯rms choose the intensity of their R&D e®ort. This R&D lowers their cost of production. In the second stage, they compete in the market by choosing quantities/prices. The R&D e®ort of a¯rm has positive spillovers: it helps in lowering the costs of all other¯rms. Thus, these spillovers generate an externality. The literature examines the role of cooperative R&D in resolving the incentive problems arising out of the externality. In particular, existing work compares the level of R&D e®ort under two di®erent situations. The¯rst situation is the pure non-cooperative model, where both R&D e®ort as well as the strategy in the market stage is non-cooperatively chosen. The second situation is a mixed one: the R&D is chosen in a cooperative manner so as to maximize the joint pro¯ts of¯rms, while the strategies at the market stage are chosen in a non-cooperative manner. In the latter case, it is assumed that the¯rms form a grand coalition. Thus, in this literature the group sizes are exogenously speci¯ed.
Our paper makes two contributions to this literature. The¯rst contribution is the formulation of spillovers. In our model, spillovers accrue only in the event of collaboration and are therefore not industry wide, as is the case in this literature. In particular, we allow for the extent of spillovers to be related to the`distance' between the¯rms in a collaboration network. The network framework permits a natural de¯nition of the distance. This allows us to model the idea that¯rms that are`far apart' receive lower spillovers as compared to¯rms that are`close' in the network. The second contribution of our paper pertains to the study of stable networks. In the existing literature, the group structure is usually exogenously speci¯ed. By contrast, we allow for collaboration structures to be endogenously determined and study the nature of stable networks.
The model is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we present two examples relating to network formation in the case of price and quantity competition, respectively. This motivates the general analysis of network formation in oligopoly, which is presented in Section 4. We discuss extensions { to allow positive spillovers, for¯xed costs of link formation, and asymmetric¯rms { and some conceptual issues in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes.
The Model
We consider a setting in which a set of¯rms¯rst choose their collaboration links with other¯rms. These collaboration agreements are pair-wise and help lower marginal costs of production. The¯rms then compete in the product market by choosing either quantities or prices. We are interested in the network of collaboration that emerges in this setting. We now develop the required terminology and provide some de¯nitions.
Networks
Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng denote a¯nite set of ex-ante identical¯rms. To avoid trivialities, we shall assume that n¸3. For any i; j 2 N , the pair-wise relationship between the two¯rms is captured by a binary variable, g 2 f0; 1g; g = 1 means that a direct link is established i;j i;j between¯rms i and j while g = 0 means that no direct link is formed. By de¯nition,
of the pair-wise collaboration relationships that exist between the¯rms in N . We let G c denote the set of all networks. Two special cases are the complete network, g , in which e g = 1 8i; j 2 N , and the empty network, g , in which g = 0 8i; j 2 N , i 6 = j. Let g + g i;j i;j i;j denote the network obtained by replacing g = 0 in network g by g = 1. Similarly, let i;j i;j g ¡ g denote the network obtained by replacing g = 1 in network g by g = 0.
i;j i;j i;j
Given a network g, let N (g) = fi 2 N : 9j 6 = i s:t: g = 1g. Each¯rm in N (g) has at least i;j c e one direct link to another distinct¯rm in the network g. Therefore, N (g ) = n and N (g ) = ;. We will let jN (g)j denote the cardinality of N (g). A path in g connecting¯rms i and j is a distinct set of¯rms fi ; : : in g connecting i and j , and for all i 2 N (g ) and j 2 N (g), g = 1 implies g 2 g .
i;j i;j 0 Generally, in a component g with three or more agents, there will exist agents i and j 0 0 such that d (g )¸2. We shall say that a component g ½ g is complete if g = 1 for all ij i;j 0 i; j 2 N (g ).
Collaboration Links and Cost Reduction
A collaboration link in our framework can be interpreted in di®erent ways. One possible interpretation is that¯rms form collaborations to share the costs of a common facility.
The facility may involve some large¯xed costs and, therefore, the collaboration generates economies of scale which lowers costs of production of the collaborating¯rm. A second interpretation is that¯rms have an agreement to jointly invest in cost-reducing R&D activity. When cost-reducing activity takes the form of capacity-sharing agreements, gains from cooperation may decrease due to congestion as a¯rm forms additional links. In this case marginal cost is a decreasing convex function of the number of direct links. Alternatively, it is also possible that bene¯ts from cooperation increase as a¯rm forms additional links. For instance, a larger number of links between¯rms aids standardization of the product with ensuing gains from network externalities. In this formulation, marginal cost is a decreasing concave function of the number of links. The following formulation accomodates these di®erent possibilities.
We assume throughout that the extent of cost reduction via collaborations is exogenously speci¯ed. This simpli¯es the analysis and allows us to focus on the structure of stable networks under oligopolistic competition. To check for robustness of our¯ndings, we brie°y examine the impact of¯xed costs of link formation in Section 5.2.
Payo®s
Given a network g,¯rm i's cost for producing an output, q , is given by the following cost 
Stable and E±cient Networks
A network g is stable if for all i; j 2 N :
In words, in a stable network, any¯rm that is directly linked to another has a strict incentive to maintain the link and any two¯rms that are not directly linked have no strict incentive to form a direct link with each other. The above de¯nition of stability is inspired by a related notion of stability presented in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . We discuss the two di®erent de¯nitions in Section 5.4 below.
This de¯nition of stability re°ects the idea that a link is formed if and only if both¯rms forming the link. It implicitly incorporates the view that link formation may involve small costs: thus individual¯rms will only form a link if such a link generates strictly positive pro¯ts. The second idea is that of the absence of transfers: we suppose that there are no transfers possible across links. Taken together with the idea of small positive costs of link formation, this implies that both¯rms must make strictly greater pro¯ts, by forming a link.
The requirements above are very weak and should be seen as necessary conditions for a network to be stable. One of the points of our analysis is that these weak requirements provide su±cient structure in an interesting class of network games.
In order to study e±cient networks, we need to consider aggregate welfare. For any network g, this is de¯ned as the sum of consumer surplus and aggregate pro¯ts of the n¯rms. We
shall say that a network g is e±cient if W (g )¸W (g), for all g 2 G.
Homogeneous Product Oligopoly
In this section, we analyze the nature of collaboration among¯rms in a homogeneous product oligopoly, i.e., a market where the outputs of the¯rms are perfect substitutes. In particular, 4 we restrict attention to linear inverse market demand:
The pro¯ts of the¯rms depend on the nature of market competition. In the following subsections, we will consider both price and quantity competition.
Linear Marginal Costs
In this subsection, we assume that marginal costs are linearly decreasing in the number of links that a¯rm has. Formally, the marginal cost structure is given by (1) . To ensure that all¯rms make positive pro¯ts we shall assume that ® > 3°and°¸(n ¡ 1)°. We start price grid) allow us to state that there exists an equilibrium, and in this equilibrium a¯rm will make pro¯ts only if it is the unique minimal cost¯rm in the market. In other words:
Since g is arbitrary, the above expression allows us to specify the payo®s for all possible networks. What are the stable networks of collaboration in this setting of extreme competition?
The following result provides a complete answer to this question: Proof Consider some non-empty network g. There are two possibilities. First, there is some¯rm i 2 N which is the unique lowest cost¯rm. But this implies that¯rm i must have at least two links since all¯rms are ex-ante identical. However, since¯rm i is the unique lowest cost¯rm, all other¯rms make zero pro¯ts. In particular, consider j 6 = i such that g = 1. For this¯rm, condition (i) of stability is violated since
Hence,¯rm i cannot be uniquely minimal cost in a stable network.
The second possibility, given that links are bilateral, is that one or more pairs of¯rms have minimal cost. Let i; j 2 N be two¯rms with minimal costs. Under price competition both rms make zero pro¯ts. If these¯rms would delete their links they would still make zero
. This once again violates condition (i) of stability.
Thus the only candidate for a stable network is g . Condition (i) is trivially satis¯ed since e there are no links to sever. In the network g + g , there are two lowest cost¯rms, i and j.
i;j
From (5), it follows that both¯rms will get a payo® of zero. Thus condition (ii) is satis¯ed.
This completes the proof.
4
The arguments in this proof are very general; in particular, we do not make use of the linear structure of the demand or the cost function. This suggests that the absence of collaborative links is likely to obtain in general settings where competition is extreme (see Section 4.1).
Next, we turn to Cournot competition between the¯rms. We start by de¯ning the payo®s in the quantity competition game. Given any network g, the Cournot equilibrium output can be written as:
This implies that aggregate Cournot output, for a given g, is:
The second stage Cournot pro¯ts for¯rm i 2 N are given by ¦ (g) = q (g). In our study i i
of stable networks, we will¯nd it convenient to use a positive monotone transform of thē rm's pro¯ts to write the payo®s as follows:
Our restrictions on the parameters ensures that each¯rm produces a positive quantity in the Cournot game. We can now characterize the stable collaboration networks under quantity competition. Proof We¯rst show that g is stable. In g ;´(g ; 1) = n ¡ 1; 8i 2 N . Therefore,¯rm i i has a marginal cost of°¡°(n ¡ 1) and payo® of:
i 0
There are no links to add so condition (ii) of stability is automatically satis¯ed. We check condition (i) next. Suppose we set g = 0 for some pair i and j . In the ensuing network, i;j c g ¡ g , the payo® to i is given by:
The payo® to¯rm j is identical. There is no incentive to delete link g = 1 since
We now show that g is the unique stable network. Consider a stable network g 6 = g . Then, there exists a pair of¯rms i; j 2 N with g = 0. We show that both i and j are strictly i;j better o® by forming a link. In the network, g + g , the payo® to¯rm i is given by:
Note that´(g + g ; 1) =´(g; 1) + 1 for l = i; j and´(g + g ; 1) =´(g; 1) for k 6 = i; j.
Thus, condition (ii) is violated and g is not stable,
The intuition behind this result is as follows. First note that if two¯rms form a link then the costs of all other¯rms are una®ected, while the cost advantage to both¯rms forming a link is the same under (1). An inspection of the pro¯t expression in (8) reveals that the positive e®ects on the pro¯ts of a¯rm i from a link with another¯rm j is given by n°, while the negative e®ects are given by°. Thus link formation is clearly pro¯t enhancing. This argument shows that any network other than the complete network cannot be stable. To see why the complete network is stable note that no further links can be added, while the deletion of a link by a¯rm i, with (say)¯rm j only increases the costs of¯rm i and j but leaves the costs of all other¯rms una®ected, lowering pro¯ts of¯rm i by (n ¡ 1)°. Thus it is not pro¯table to delete links either. This completes the argument.
It is interesting to compare our result with that of Bloch [3, Proposition 2] who, under a similar speci¯cation of demand and marginal cost, derives a stable coalition structure consisting of two asymmetrically-sized coalitions in which the number of¯rms in the larger coalition is the integer closest to 3(n + 1)=4. To explain this sharp di®erence in our results, 0 consider some¯rm i who belongs to a complete component, g , with k¸2¯rms. In the network framework, since collaboration links can be intransitive,¯rm i can initiate a link 0 with some¯rm j = 2 N (g ) if it is pro¯table to do so. Given (1) and (4), Proposition 3.2 shows that i and j always establish a link because it yields a net gain of (n ¡ 1)°> 0.
In the coalition framework of Bloch [3, 4] , however, collaboration links are, by assumption, transitive; therefore, i can form a link with j if and only if all other k¯rms in the same coalition as i agree to merge with the singleton coalition fjg. However, it may be no longer pro¯table for¯rm i to have a collaboration link with j in the coalition framework where, under a merger of coalitions, all other k¯rms will have a link with j as well. In this case, each of the k 6 = i¯rms in the coalition experiences a reduction in marginal cost of°. Further, rm j experiences a reduction of (k + 1)°in its marginal costs because of its k + 1 additional links after the merger. Therefore, the payo® to¯rm i changes by (n ¡ 1)°¡ 2k°. If i is already a part of a large coalition (k > (n ¡ 1)=2), then it may not want to be part of a merger with the singleton fjg.
Non-linear Marginal Costs
In this section we examine non-linear reductions in marginal cost. For price competition, the empty network continues to be the unique stable network even if we allow for a general marginal cost function. Therefore, in the following analysis, we restrict attention to Cournot competition. Here the analysis is more interesting, since the relative decrease in costs matters in the incentives to form links. Our analysis suggests that incomplete and intransitive networks arise naturally in this setting.
Recall that under Cournot competition, when the inverse demand is given by (4), the Cournot equilibrium output for a generally speci¯ed marginal cost vector, c(g) is given by:
The Cournot pro¯ts of¯rm i are q (g). Under a monotonic transform, we can write the
We consider the following simple case: a¯rm gains from forming collaboration links only if it has a small number of links, after a critical number of links have been reached, there are 5 no further gains from forming additional links. (1) is a special case of (13) for k¸n ¡ 1. Therefore, in the following we assume ¤ that k < n ¡ 1. We can now characterize the structure of stable networks. The proof is given in Appendix A. Figure 3 gives examples of stable networks under convex costs. The¯rst part of the result is particularly interesting, since it illustrates that intran-¤ sitive networks can be stable. In fact, in the set of connected networks, since k < n ¡ 1 by assumption, the¯rst part of the above proposition implies that that all stable networks must be intransitive. The intuition behind this result is simple: each¯rm lowers costs for ¤ every additional link if and only if it has fewer than k links. Deleting a link lowers profits; this follows from arguments in Proposition 3.2, while forming additional links is at best
worthless, since there is no cost reduction from links over and above k links.
Next, we consider the case where cost reduction requires a certain minimum number of links.
We specify the following functional form: and all other¯rms constitute singleton components.
The proof is given in Appendix A. Figure 4 shows the set of stable networks in a market ¤ ¤ with n = 5 and k = 3. Given that k < n ¡ 1, the stability of the complete network follows from arguments in Proposition 3.2. The stability of the empty network follows by noting that forming only one link is not worthwhile. Consider non-empty but incomplete networks the component must be complete. These arguments constitute the proof of the proposition. The second part of the proof shows how the delimited set of networks is stable.
E±cient Networks
In this section, we study e±cient networks under price and quantity competition. On the demand side, we restrict attention to the linear speci¯cation given by (4). On the cost side, however, the analysis is relatively general and accommodates the various speci¯cations of marginal cost listed under (1), (13) and (14) .
We now examine the nature of e±cient networks, under price competition. Let c be the minimum cost attainable by a¯rm in any network. Under (1), and (14), this is achieved
when a¯rm has (n ¡ 1) links, while under (13) it is achieved if a¯rm has at least k links.
The following result provides a complete characterization of e±cient networks. The arguments given below can be extended in a straightforward manner to the case of spillovers, which are discussed later in section 5.1.
Proof Fix some network g. Let¯rm i be a minimum cost¯rm in this network and let its cost be given by c (g) > c. Let equilibrium price be given by p(g). Under price competition, 
It is easily seen that this expression is strictly declining with respect to p(g) so long as
Thus for a network g, the potential social welfare is bounded above by the
It is easily checked that this maximum potential social welfare is decreasing in c (g) and i is, therefore, maximized when the price in the market is equal to c. Thus social welfare is maximized when the product is produced and sold at the minimum marginal cost, c.
Note that if there is only one¯rm with this minimum cost, then under price competition it will charge a price higher than c, and earn positive pro¯ts in equilibrium. If there are two or more¯rms with this minimum cost, then price competition will force the¯rms to charge this minimum cost. Thus two or more¯rms are necessary as well as su±cient for the market price to be equal to the minimum cost level. This completes the proof.
4
In the case of price competition, we observe a con°ict between stability and e±ciency in networks. The stability result indicates that, irrespective of the speci¯cation of marginal cost, no¯rm has any incentive to form a link with another. E±ciency, on the other hand, dictates a connected network under (1) and (14); under (13), e±ciency requires either a 0 connected network, or an unconnected network in which at least one component g satis¯es
We now consider the nature of e±cient networks under quantity competition. Let c(0) denote the marginal cost of a¯rm with no links and c(n ¡ 1) the marginal cost with (n ¡ 1)
links. To ensure that all¯rms produce a strictly positive output in the Cournot equilibrium corresponding to any network, we will maintain the restriction that ® > 3nc(0). Social welfare is de¯ned as:
We shall consider a general class of marginal cost functions that satisfy ( 2). This formulation accommodates the linear speci¯cation of marginal cost given by (1) . Further, as long as each ¤ rm has at least k links, it also covers concave marginal costs speci¯ed by (14) . For all c these cases, the following proposition shows that adding a link in any arbitrary g 6 = g c 9
strictly increases social welfare implying thereby that g is uniquely e±cient. Proof Consider any network g 6 = g with g = 0 for some i; j 2 N . Letting ¤í ;j P fc (g)¡c (g+g )g, it follows that ¢q (g)´q (g+g )¡q (g) = fc (g) ¡ c (g + g )g¡ k k i;j l l i;j l l l i;j k2fi;jg ¤=(n + 1), l 2 fi; jg. Further, for any¯rm k = 2 fi; jg, ¢q (g) = ¡¤=(n + 1). Therefore, the k change in aggregate pro¯ts is given by:
The case of concave marginal costs needs to be quali¯ed because if all¯rms have less than k links, then adding another link may not strictly increase social welfare. But such networks cannot be e±cient because social welfare will strictly increase with each additional link by virtue of Proposition 3.6 once all¯rms have
at least k links. If (n ¡ 1)¯rms have k or more links and¯rm i has less than k links, then any link of i with some j 6 = i will only reduce the marginal cost of i. This case can be covered similar to Corollary 3.1 which follows Proposition 3.6. We have bunched the concave case with speci¯cation (1) because, in contrast to the convex case, it has the complete network as uniquely e±cient.
The change in consumer surplus, ¢CS(g)´CS(g + g ) ¡ CS(g), is given by:
Therefore, to show that W (g + g ) ¡ W (g) > 0, it su±ces to show that:
After some manipulation, we can simplify (19) to:
Theoretically, the lowest output produced by any¯rm is when it is a singleton and all other rms belong to a complete component. This is given by:
Similarly, theoretically the largest possible output that can be produced by any¯rm is when its marginal cost is minimum at c(n ¡ 1) and all other¯rms are singletons with the highest marginal cost of c(0). This is given by:
Therefore, (20) holds for any arbitrary network if it holds when q (g) = q for l 2 fi; jg and l q (g) = q for k = 2 fi; jg. Substituting (21) and (22) 1) )]c(0) which is true under our assumption that ® > 3nc(0).
In the case where marginal cost is speci¯ed by (13), it is possible that an additional link only ¤ reduces the marginal cost of one¯rm (which has less than k links) and not the collaborator ¤ (which has more than k links). The following corollary adds to Proposition 3.6 by demonstrating that social welfare increases strictly when an additional link strictly decreases the marginal cost of just one¯rm while leaving all other (n ¡ 1) marginal costs una®ected.
Corollary 3.1 Suppose demand is speci¯ed by (4) and marginal cost is speci¯ed by (13).
¤ Under quantity competition, any network in which each¯rm has at least k links is e±cient. to showing ®(n + 2) + c(n ¡ 1)[(2n + 1)(n ¡ 1) + n(n ¡ 1)] > c(0)[(2n + 1)n + (n ¡ 1) ] which is true under our parametric restriction ® > 3nc(0).
4
Our results on quantity competition in networks do not indicate the sharp divergence between stability and e±ciency that is exhibited under price competition in networks as well as in the literature on formation of coalitions under price and quantity competition. When marginal costs are linear, then the complete network is both uniquely stable and uniquely e±cient in the class of all networks. With concave marginal costs, the complete network is stable and uniquely e±cient; therefore, the set of e±cient networks is a proper subset of the set of stable networks. When marginal costs are convex, the set of stable networks and the set of ¤ e±cient networks have in common all networks in which each¯rm has exactly k links.
Network Formation under General Payo®s
Our analysis of the Bertrand and Cournot models of market competition under homogeneous linear inverse demand suggests that the nature of market competition has a major in°uence on the structure of networks that we should expect to see. We now analyze the robustness of this¯nding under more general conditions on the nature of demand, the cost function, and types of market competition.
Collaboration under Aggressive Competition
In this subsection, we characterize the structure of stable networks under aggressive competition. The notion of aggressive competition should be seen as a generalization of Bertrand competition for a homogeneous good. We shall say that competition among¯rms is aggressive if all but the lowest cost¯rms make zero pro¯ts. There are two sub-cases: one, the lowest cost¯rm makes positive pro¯ts only if it is the unique such¯rm, and two, all the lowest cost¯rms make positive pro¯ts. The former case is written as follows:
This speci¯cation generalizes the Bertrand competition of Section 3 to allow for general demand functions and also general cost reduction functions. We can now state our¯rst general result on the architecture of stable networks in an oligopoly. We now analyze the case where all lowest cost¯rms make positive pro¯ts. This case may be formally written as follows:
By way of motivation, consider a set of¯rms that are competing to apply for a patent for a cost reducing process technology. Suppose that each of the¯rms has some useful complementary knowledge. If they collaborate then this knowledge can be jointly used to lower costs. Moreover, only the lowest cost technology is patented. Once the patent is available, it is randomly allotted to one of the¯rms who have the lowest cost technology. Price competition then ensures that only this¯rm makes pro¯ts. The positive pro¯ts mentioned above then should be seen as the (ex-ante) expected pro¯ts from collaboration.
In our analysis we shall use the following symmetry assumption with respect to the lowest cost¯rms.
Assumption SY1 Fix some g. Suppose that for a pair of¯rms i and j, c (g
In words, the¯rst condition says that if in g two¯rms have minimum costs and they are not connected directly, then they get strictly greater payo®s if they form a direct link. It is immediate that such a direct link will lower the costs of only these two¯rms and thus improve their competitive position relative to the rest of the¯rms. It seems natural then that their payo®s should also increase. Hence the two¯rms that form a link will still remain the minimum cost¯rms and will also gain competitive advantage since their costs will go down more as compared to the others¯rms, who may be linked to them directly or indirectly.
The second condition says that in a network g, if two minimum cost¯rms have a link then this link is strictly advantageous, in the sense that deleting this link will strictly lower the payo®s of the¯rms. The reasoning behind this condition is analogous to the¯rst condition.
Symmetry in the presence of aggressive competition has strong implications for collaboration. This is demonstrated in the following result.
Theorem 4.2 Let n¸4. Suppose (AC) and (SY1) hold and marginal cost is speci¯ed by (2) . Then a network is stable if and only if it has the following structure: there is a complete component with k 2 f3; 4; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; ng¯rms and all the other n ¡ k¯rms constitute singleton components.
The number of stable networks is very small as compared to the number of total networks. For example, when n is 3, 4, 5 or 6, the total number of networks is given by 8, 64, 1024 and 32768. By contrast, the number of stable networks is given by 3, 5, 16, and 42. Thus the two simple requirements of stability lead to a strong restriction on the class of networks.
The argument in the proof of this theorem proceeds as follows:¯rst we show that any nonsingleton component in a stable network must be complete. In proving this property, we also establish that all¯rms in a non-singleton component must have the same costs and that these costs must be the minimum in the given network. Second, we show that there can be at most one non-singleton component in a stable network. These two properties reduce the set of candidates for stable networks dramatically. The last step then completes the 10 characterization. The proof builds on two lemmas.
Lemma 4.1 Let g be a stable network. Then every non-singleton component in g is complete.
0
Proof Suppose that g is a stable network and g ½ g is a non-singleton component of g.
We show that g must be complete. We know that no unique¯rm can have the lowest cost 0 in g ; this follows from an argument as in the¯rst part of Proposition 3.1. Thus, there must 10 The above result is stated for n¸4. It is easily seen that in case of n = 3 an analogous result obtains: a stable network is either complete or has two components, one component with two¯rms and the other component with a singleton¯rm. We have stated the result for n¸4 as it allows for a simpler statement. We next characterize the number of non-singleton components. 
4
We have shown that in a market with four or more¯rms there can be at most one nonsingleton component, and that it is complete. This means that the only candidates for stable networks are networks of the following form: there is a complete component with k¸1¯rms and there are n ¡ k singleton components. The proof of the theorem shows that networks with k = 1 and k = 2 are not stable, while the networks with k¸3 are stable. (2) will remain below the marginal cost of¯rm j. Thus¯rm j has no incentive to form such a link. Since k¸3, and competition is speci¯ed by assumption (AC), it is also clear that two singleton component rms j and k do not have an incentive to form a link either. Finally, using assumption (SY1(ii)), it follows that¯rms in the non-singleton component have no incentive to delete a link. We have thus shown that both requirements (i) and (ii) are satis¯ed for any network with the structure: a non-singleton complete component with k¸3¯rms and n¡k singleton rms. This completes the proof. 
Collaboration under Moderate Competition
We now consider a market in which competition is such that all¯rms, irrespective of their costs, make positive pro¯ts. However, lower cost¯rms make higher pro¯ts. Such a situation is described as moderate competition. Formally, this situation is captured in the following assumption:
The next assumption concerns the payo®s of similar cost¯rms and is a stronger version of Assumption SY1, stated in the previous section.
Assumption SY2 Fix some g. Suppose that for a pair of¯rms i and j, c (g) = c (g).
Essentially we require the conditions mentioned in the earlier assumption to hold for all symmetrically located¯rms and not just the minimum cost¯rms. We note that this assumption implicitly incorporates the idea of moderate competition: for example, part (i) cannot be satis¯ed under aggressive competition, for a pair of high cost¯rms. Symmetry in the presence of moderate competition implies the following property of stable networks.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose that (SY2) and (2) hold. Consider a stable network, g. If
Proof Let g be stable. If´(g; 1) =´(g; 1) = n, then by de¯nition g = 1. Therefore,
consider the case where´(g; 1) =´(g; 1) < n and g = 0. Under (2) the costs of i and j are
This violates requirement (ii) of stability and contradicts the j i;j j hypothesis that g is stable.
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Remark: We note here that (SY1) is not su±cient for the conclusion of Proposition 4.1. In our earlier result on completeness of components, Lemma 4.1, we used assumption (AC) in addition to (SY1).
Proposition 4.1 has several interesting implications for the nature of stable networks. Thē rst implication is that a stable network cannot have two or more singleton components. This implies in particular that the empty network cannot be stable. The second implication is that the star/hub-spokes network is not stable. This is because in all these networks, there are at least two¯rms i and j who have the same number of direct links but g = 0. By i;j Proposition 4.1, such¯rms have an incentive to form a direct link. A third implication of this result is that if a stable network contains two or more complete components then they must be of unequal size.
In general many networks can be stable. We now examine some properties of stable networks.
The¯rst question pertains to the set of symmetric stable networks. The result above implies that if all¯rms have the same cost, then every pair of¯rms must be directly linked; thus, the only candidate for stability is the complete network. Proof We provide a proof of the¯rst statement. The second statement is immediate and c c a proof is omitted. In g ,´(g ; 1) = n ¡ 1; 8i 2 N . Therefore, all¯rms have the same cost i and this is the minimum cost. There are no links to add so requirement (ii) of stability is automatically satis¯ed. We check requirement (i) next. Suppose we set g = 0 for some i;j c pair i and j. In the ensuing network, g ¡ g , assumption (SY2)(ii) implies that both¯rms i;j c i and j loose strictly. This implies that requirement (i) is also satis¯ed. Thus g is stable.
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The additional monotonicity condition in Theorem 4.3 may seem strong. However, it is satis¯ed by Cournot oligopoly under fairly general demand conditions. Suppose that the inverse demand, p(Q), satis¯es the following general speci¯cation: p(Q) is a twice continu-0 00
ously di®erentiable function with p (Q) < 0 and p (Q) · 0. We show that if inverse demand satis¯es this condition, then the additional monotonicity condition on pro¯ts of the¯rms is also satis¯ed. The details are in Appendix B. It is easily veri¯ed that this condition is also satis¯ed by the standard model of a di®erentiated oligopoly with linear demand and linearly
11
reducing costs (as in (1)).
Finally, we note that the monotonicity condition in Theorem 4.3 is also satis¯ed in the case where each of the¯rms is a monopoly in its own market. This is true since the onlỳ costs' of forming links in our model arise out of the greater competitiveness of a¯rm whose costs are lowered. However, if the other¯rms are in unrelated markets then there is nò cost' to forming additional links while there are bene¯ts in terms of of lowering marginal costs of production. It is then immediate that in such a case every pair of¯rms has an incentive to form links and thus the unique stable network is the complete network. This nding supports the general argument in the paper: collaboration among¯rms is easier when market competition is mild.
We brie°y comment on the number of components under general costs conditions. We know from Proposition 4.1 that complete components in stable network are of unequal size. This allows us to derive an upper bound on the number of complete components in a market with a¯xed number of¯rms. The idea here is that minimum number of¯rms needed to support k unequal components is given by k(k + 1)=2. This implies that for a¯xed number of¯rms, n, the maximum number of complete components possible in a stable network is given by the largest number k that satis¯ed the inequality k(k + 1)=2 · n. This implies, for instance, that in a market with 10¯rms there are at most 4 complete components.
Discussion
In this section we brie°y discuss the role of some assumptions in our analysis.
Spillovers
In the analysis so far, we have restricted attention to the case where there are no spillovers across the collaborative links of¯rms. We found that the nature of stable collaborative arrangements di®er considerably from the¯ndings in the literature on coalition formation.
An important assumption in our analysis has been the absence of spillovers and in this section we examine if this is crucial for our results. The analysis is brief and our results are quite incomplete. However, they serve to illustrate two points: one, that the complete network is stable so long as spillovers are positive but imperfect and two, that incomplete networks can also be stable in the presence of spillovers.
In principle, it is possible that the collaborative links of a collaborator will also have some in°uence on the bene¯ts that a¯rm can expect from the joint R&D activity. These indirect e®ects can be negative (when resources can be diverted into competing collaborations) or positive (if there are cross-collaboration knowledge spillovers). We follow the literature (for instance, d'Aspremont and Jacquemin [7] , Kamien, Muller and Zang [13] , Suzumura [21] and Leahy and Neary [16] ) in considering the case of positive spillovers in our analysis.
Let ± 2 [0; 1] be a parameter measuring the extent of spillovers. The case of ± = 0 corresponds to zero spillovers. The extent of spillovers is increasing in ± and is perfect when ± = 1. The e®ects of indirect collaborations are inversely related to the distance between two¯rms, in a network. An example of a simple cost function which re°ects this is:
If there is no path between two¯rms in a given network, then the distance between them is 1, and there are thus no spillovers. In our speci¯cation, spillovers only occur if two¯rms i and j are either directly or indirectly connected.
It is relatively straightforward to extend the arguments for Bertrand competition and more generally, aggressive competition, to cover the case of positive spillovers. The same results on stable and e±cient networks obtain. In what follows, we will therefore focus on the case of quantity competition. In this setting, the e®ects of spillovers are substantive. The complete network remains stable under positive spillovers; however, even in the basic linear demand model with linear cost reduction, other networks can be stable. Broadly speaking, this suggests that spillovers have a negative e®ect on the incentives for collaborative relationships.
We start by stating a fairly general result on the stability of the complete network under moderate competition and in the presence of positive spillovers.
Proposition 5.1 Suppose (SY2) holds and marginal cost is speci¯ed by (23) . Then the c complete network, g , is stable.
The proof of this proposition follows along the lines of Theorem 4.3, and is omitted.
We have been unable to obtain a complete characterization of stable networks in the presence of spillovers. To get some intuition into the e®ects of spillovers, we consider an example.
This example illustrates that positive spillovers can lead to less collaboration under moderate competition. Recall from Proposition 3.2 that the complete network is the unique stable network when demand is linear and marginal cost is speci¯ed by (1) . We now show that with positive spillovers speci¯ed quite generally by (23) , in addition to the complete network, some incomplete networks can also be stable.
Example: The impact of spillovers Let n = 10. Suppose the demand is linear as in Section 3, and let the cost reduction function satisfy (23) . Moreover,¯rms compete in quantities. We show that a network g with two complete components, one with 8¯rms and another with 2¯rms is stable. Let the¯rms in the¯rst component be numbered from 1 to 8 while¯rms 9 and 10 belong to the second component. Figure 5 below gives an example of such a network.
We begin by showing that no¯rm in this network has an incentive to delete links. The condition of all¯rms in component 1 is symmetric. The payo® to¯rm 1 in network g is
] . The payo® to¯rm 1, from the network g ¡ g is
] . Using the fact that these components
in g are complete, it follows that¯rm 1 looses payo® by deleting the link g . Identical 1;2 arguments apply in the case of¯rms 9 and 10. Thus requirement (i) is satis¯ed by g. We now check the incentives of¯rms to form additional links.
Suppose without loss of generality that¯rms 1 and 9 form link. The payo® to¯rm 1 is given
c (g +c ))=11] . Consider, for the sake of argument, the case of
perfect spillovers, i.e., where ± = 1. In this case, the payo® to¯rm 1 in the network g + g is continuous with respect to the spillover parameter, ±, the strict inequality also obtains for ± close to 1. Given the symmetry of¯rms location in component 1, no¯rm in this component has an incentive to form a link with a¯rm in component 2. Thus requirement (ii) is also satis¯ed and the network g is stable. 
Fixed Costs of Link Formation
In our analysis, we have assumed that link formation does not involve any direct costs. Our de¯nition of stability implicitly allows for small costs of forming links, but signi¯cant costs are ruled out. In this section, we discuss the nature of stable networks when every¯rm has to incur a¯xed cost, denoted by F , for every link it forms with another¯rm. This¯xed cost can be interpreted as the contribution to joint research or as the individual¯rm's share of the cost of a common facility created by the collaboration between the¯rms.
We study the nature of stable networks in the linear demand model with no spillovers presented in Section 3.1. Apart from an additional cost for every link formed by¯rm, the payo®s of a¯rm are as speci¯ed before.
Recall that under price competition, even in the absence of¯xed costs of link formation, the unique stable network was the empty network. The introduction of¯xed costs of link formation can only make the prospects of link formation less sanguine. It is easily checked that the empty network is the unique stable network under price competition. In what follows we therefore focus on the case of quantity competition.
The¯rst step in the analysis is to note the following interesting property of stable networks:
Lemma 5.1 Consider the linear demand model with quantity competition. Suppose that
(1) and (4) hold. Let i and j be two distinct¯rms. Then any stable network satis¯es the following property: if there exists a¯rm k such that g = 1 and a¯rm l such that g = 1,
i;k j;l then it must also be true that g = 1.
Proof The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that g = 0. Since g is stable it follows that
Using the expressions for pro¯ts stated in section 3, we can rewrite
this condition as follows:
It is convenient to de¯ne:
Then we can rewrite the above inequality as follows:
Next we observe that the additional (gross) payo® to¯rm i from forming a link with¯rm j is given by ¼ (g + g ) ¡ ¼ (g). This can be written as follows:
Using the above de¯nition of T (g) this can be rewritten as follows:
From the above calculations, it is immediate that
Since the right hand side term is larger than F , it follows that¯rm i has an incentive to form a link with¯rm j. The only property we have used is that¯rm i has a link with some other rm. In this respect the situation of¯rm j is similar. Hence, using identical arguments, we can show that¯rm j has an incentive to form a link with¯rm i. This shows that g is not stable, a contradiction which completes the proof.
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The lemma says that, in a stable network, if a pair of¯rms have any links at all then they must also be linked with each other. The proof exploits the convexity of the pro¯t function with respect to the level of costs. The lemma has some interesting implications: one, it implies that every component in a stable network must be complete; two, it implies that in a stable network, there will be at most one non-singleton component. Thus this lemma sharply restricts the set of possible networks that can be stable. The following proposition summarizes these observations and also shows that stable networks always exist. De¯ne Proof The payo® to a¯rm i from the complete network is given by,
The payo® to a¯rm i if it were to delete one of its (n ¡ 1) links is given by,
Thus the change in payo® to¯rm i by deleting a link with another¯rm j, given that all the other¯rms are directly linked is given by,
This expression is negative if and only if F < F . Similarly, we can check the conditions for the empty network to be stable. 
Asymmetries and Stable Networks
In the analysis we have assumed that all¯rms are ex-ante symmetric with respect to initial costs. Moreover, they also have the same costs reduction function. In this section we brie°y discuss the role of this symmetry assumption with the help of a simple example. The main point of this example is to illustrate that intransitive networks { such as stars { can arise when rms are ex-ante asymmetric. The general model of asymmetric¯rms is quite complicated and its analysis lies outside the scope of the present paper.
Example: Asymmetries and intransitive networks Suppose there are three¯rms, 1,2 and 3 with initial costs given by c (0) =°, c (0) = 2°, and c (0) = 2°, respectively. Let To see the incentives of the¯rms suppose that 2 is the center of the star. In this star network rms 2 and 1 have both moved down to a cost level of 0, while¯rm 3 still has a a positive cost level. It follows that¯rm 3 will in principle be interested in forming a link with¯rm 1.
But¯rm 1 will not gain anything in terms of costs since its costs are already zero, while a link with¯rm 3 will lower the costs of¯rm 3, making it more competitive, thereby lowering the pro¯ts of¯rm 1. It is easily checked that this star is stable. Similar calculations prove that the star with 3 at the center is also stable. Direct comparisons of payo®s show that (apart from the star with 3 at the center) there is no other stable network.
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This example also shows that intransitive networks arise quite naturally with asymmetric rms. This provides a motivation for a further study of network games, since this approach allows for intransitive relationships, unlike the earlier approach based on coalitions.
Notion of Stability
We have employed a notion of stability which requires that in a network each link formed must generate strictly greater payo®s for the concerned¯rms and secondly that there are no unformed links with this property. In an earlier paper, Jackson and Wolinsky [11] , proposed a related notion of stability. Their de¯nition of stability { which we shall term JW-stability { had two requirements. A network g is JW-stable if for all i; j 2 N , The¯rst requirement in the two de¯nitions pertains to the incentives for having the existing links. In our de¯nition, we require that all such links yield strictly greater payo®s to thē rms that form such links, while in their de¯nition, Jackson and Wolinsky require only that existing links yield non-negative additional payo®s. This suggests that our¯rst requirement is stronger. This has important e®ects on the results. For instance, take the Bertrand example of Section 3. In this setting, we showed that the unique stable network was the empty network. On the other hand, it can be veri¯ed that under price competition, the complete network is JW-stable! The second requirement pertains to potential links which are not formed in a given network.
We require that such unformed links not be strictly pro¯table for the¯rms individually. By contrast, Jackson and Wolinsky require that if such a link is strictly pro¯table to one¯rm then it should not be unpro¯table for the other¯rm. In this case, our requirement is milder than their requirement. This di®erence again has important e®ects. Take for example the case of aggressive competition covered by Theorem 4.2. We showed that for markets with 4 or more¯rms a stable network has the following structure: there is a non-singleton complete component of k 2 f3; 4; :::; ng¯rms and n ¡ k singleton components. It can be seen that the disconnected networks of this type, i.e., where k · n ¡ 1, are not stable under requirement (ii) of Jackson and Wolinsky. This is because a¯rm in the non-singleton component will typically have an incentive to lower its costs further while a singleton¯rm will be indi®erent between forming or not forming a link. Thus a network of the type we have identi¯ed above will violate requirement (ii) of Jackson and Wolinsky. The complete network satis¯es both their requirements.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the endogenous formation of networks in an oligopoly with either price or quantity competition. We have characterized the set of stable networks and compared them with e±cient networks. Our results suggest that except under extreme competition, a la Bertrand,¯rms have an incentive to collaborate with their competitors to lower costs of production. Stable networks of collaboration possess simple architectures, which can be characterized under a variety of circumstances. In particular, the complete network, where every¯rm has a collaboration link with every other¯rm, and the network with a dominant group, which contains a large number of completely connected¯rms and several isolated¯rms, appear to be stable under di®erent competitive environments. Finally, we observe that stable networks are often e±cient, from a social point of view. Our¯ndings are very di®erent from those derived by other authors who have used a coalition formation approach to study these questions.
We have assumed that the e®ort level in collaboration arrangements is¯xed and exogenously speci¯ed. Collaboration agreements create possibilities for free-riding and the case of endogenous e®ort levels merits closer attention. A second avenue for further research is the dynamics of network formation. We have examined a static model. There are several incentive issues that seem to be related to the timing of collaboration. This requires a dynamic model of network formation, which we hope to study in future work. To show that such networks are the only stable unconnected networks (except for g ), notē rst of all that if a component is a non-singleton, then from the proof of part 1, it must have ¤ at least k + 1¯rms and must be complete. Second, there cannot be two (or more) such 0 00 0 00
non-singleton components g ; g ½ g for otherwise i 2 N (g ) and j 2 N (g ) will pro¯t from forming a link. This proves the result. Now note that in any g 6 = g , there exist i; j such that g = 0 and some m 6 = i; j such that i;j q (g) · q (g) · q (g). In the network g + g , the¯rst order condition for any k 2 N is: Note that´(g + g ; 1) =´(g; 1) + 1 for l = i; j. Let ¢q (g)´q (g + g ) ¡ q (g). Therefore,
